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This paper examines pay determination in the labor market of a professional team sport 
hitherto neglected by researchers in the U.S.  Using data on 361 Major League Soccer 
(MLS) players for one recent league season, mean and median regression models are 
exploited to investigate salary determinants.  In comport with the available empirical 
evidence on racial pay discrimination in other professional team sports in the U.S., this 
study finds no overall evidence of pay disadvantage for non-white players. However, 
there is tentative evidence that black players who are not U.S. citizens actually fare 
worse than some other groups in salary terms. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
There exists now an extensive empirical literature on racial discrimination in professional 
team sports in the United States (U.S.) with perhaps the most intensively researched area 
focused on salary discrimination.  The evidence for racial pay discrimination within 
professional team sports appears limited.  A number of studies detected the presence of 
racial pay discrimination in professional basketball in the 1970s and early 1980s, but the 
relationship was found to have weakened substantially by the late 1990s.
1
 Further, the 
comprehensive reviews of Khan (1991; 2000) and Rosen and Sanderson (2001) report 
little empirical evidence in support of racial pay discrimination in the labor markets for 
professional football and baseball.  
 
Soccer is the most popular team sport in Europe and Frick (2007) notes that the market 
values of the largest European professional soccer clubs are comparable in magnitude to 
those of the most valuable sports franchises in the U.S. However, racial pay disparities in 
professional soccer in Europe have been the subject of minimal empirical investigation. 
The primary explanation for this is attributable to considerations of salary confidentiality.  
The limited access to information on player salaries in most European countries has 
forced investigators to rely on more indirect methods to inform this important policy 
issue.
2
   For example, Szymanski (2000), using the racial composition of English league 
teams, found that those with an above average proportion of black players tended to 
perform, on average and ceteris paribus, better that expected given the aggregate wage 
bills of these clubs. The author concludes that, since players are bought and sold in a 
competitive labor market, this reflects evidence of market-based discrimination.
3
 On the 
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other hand, Reilly and Witt (1995) and Medcalfe (2007), using data on the transfer fees 
that clubs pay for their players in the English league, found no evidence of unequal 
treatment in regard to player race, once account is taken of an array of performance and 
other characteristics.           
 
Professional soccer is less popular and less well established than other major professional 
team sports in the U.S., and the professional game was only re-launched as recently as 
1996.  However, in contrast to Europe, base salary data for players are readily available, 
as with other professional team sports, through the relevant players‟ union.  These data 
thus facilitate an analysis of pay determination of a type that is generally unfeasible for 
most professional European soccer leagues.  The key research question motivating the 
current paper is whether the absence of a relationship between pay and race, as generally 
documented in other professional team sports, is replicated for the case of professional 
soccer in the U.S.        
 
The structure of the paper is now outlined.  The next section briefly sets the context for 
our analysis by describing the recent history, organization and nature of professional 
soccer in the U.S.  This is followed by a section describing the dataset, and then one 
which reports and discusses the empirical results.  A final section offers some concluding 
remarks.   
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II. BACKGROUND 
The recent history of professional soccer in the U.S. can be traced back to the formation 
of the North American Soccer League (NASL) in 1968.  The NASL enjoyed brief 
success largely through the financial power of the New York Cosmos, a franchise then 
owned by Warner Communications, which recruited some of the world‟s best soccer 
players, though many were arguably either close to or at the end of their professional 
playing careers.
4
   At the peak of its popularity in the late 1970s, the NASL enjoyed 
relatively large attendance figures and a high media profile both in the U.S. and abroad.  
However, many franchises acted in a financially imprudent manner and over the four year 
period to 1984, the league lost 17 of its franchises and ultimately collapsed in March 
1985. 
 
The successful bid by the U.S. to stage the 1994 FIFA World Cup was conditional on the 
establishment of a professional domestic soccer league.  This occurred in 1996 with the 
formation of Major League Soccer (MLS), which now governs domestic professional 
top-flight soccer in the U.S.  The financial lessons learned from the earlier NASL 
experience helped shape the organizational structures of MLS.  The league operates as a 
single entity in which teams are centrally controlled and clubs are run as franchises. 
Revenues are shared between the league and the clubs, and player contracts are 
negotiated with the players‟ union by the league.  In the 2007 season, the league 
comprised a total of twelve franchises spread across the U.S. and one operating in 
Canada.  The clubs in the 2007 season were: Chicago Fire, Chivas USA, Columbus 
Crew, Colorado Rapids, FC Dallas, DC United, Houston Dynamo, Kansas City Wizards, 
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Los Angeles Galaxy, New England Revolution, New York Red Bulls, Real Salt Lake, 
Toronto FC.
5 
 
Professional soccer clubs in the U.S. are subject to a salary cap estimated to be of the 
order of $1.9 million for 2006.  However, under a newly introduced Designated Player 
Rule (DPR) for the 2007 season, each MLS franchise could sign up to two players whose 
salaries are not governed by the cap.  This ostensibly allows the league‟s teams to 
compete for selected players in the international soccer market and facilitated the much 
publicized arrival of David Beckham from top European club side Real Madrid to Los 
Angeles Galaxy.
6
 Other designated players followed with the former Brazilian 
international Denilson moving to FC Dallas, and Colombian international striker Angel 
and, former United States international team captain, Reyna both signing for the New 
York Red Bulls.        
 
The MLS has struggled to achieve overall profitability in its first ten years of existence.  
The movement of MLS clubs to specially constructed smaller soccer-specific stadia, 
away from the costly leasing arrangements with stadia designed primarily for use by NFL 
and NCAA clubs, is anticipated to enhance club and ultimately league profitability.  A 
number of clubs who have done so (e.g., Los Angeles Galaxy and FC Dallas) are already 
reported to be in profit and the MLS is targeting 2010 for overall league profitability.  
The league is thus best viewed as one that is still navigating its way through a difficult 
transitional period.     
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III. DATA 
The data are obtained from a variety of different sources.  The salary data are obtained 
from the MLS Players‟ Union and represent the base salary, which excludes bonuses and 
endorsements etc., and relate to the pay negotiated with the league prior to the start of the 
2007 season.  The player characteristics and performance indicators are obtained from 
either the official MLS website or official club websites.  The racial categorization of 
players was determined by the inspection of color photographs, and players were 
allocated across three different racial groups: „white‟, „black‟, or „mixed race‟.7 
 
The player characteristics include variables that capture age, playing position, time at the 
current club, whether or not the player is a U.S. citizen, whether or not the player is on 
the club‟s developmental roster, and a player‟s designated racial group. The performance 
measures include variables relating to the number of prior seasons the player has had in 
the MLS, the number of MLS games started in the previous season, the number of MLS 
games as substitute in the previous season, whether or not the player represented his 
country at senior international level, and whether or not the player has experience of 
playing abroad in higher standard European professional leagues.  
 
The dataset used in this study comprises information on 361 professional soccer players. 
8
 
Table 1 provides a description of the variables used in our empirical analysis and reports 
some selected summary statistics.  It is worth noting in passing that the average player‟s 
age is 25 years, about a third of players are on a club‟s developmental roster revealing the 
youthful demographic profile of the league‟s players, one-third are (or were) international 
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players, the overwhelming majority of players are US citizens, and about two-thirds are 
white.  Black players represent about one-quarter of the sample, while mixed race players 
comprise a more modest one-tenth.  A detailed discussion of the pay data is reserved for 
the next section.   
 
Table 1 Here 
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IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Table 2 provides summary statistics for the base pay measure, both overall and by race, 
using central tendency and dispersion statistics.  The median base pay for the sample is 
reported at $46,331 and is modest by the standards of median earnings in other U.S. 
professional team sports.
9
 The sample mean value of $103,297 is sensitive to the 
inclusion of the Beckham observation and falls by about $15,000 with the exclusion of 
this player‟s base earnings.  The dispersion in pay, as measured by the Gini and the decile 
ratio, is high by the standards of both professional team sports and other labor markets in 
the U.S.
10
   The table also reveals variation in average and median pay across the three 
broadly defined racial groups used in our analysis with black players securing lower 
average and median rewards compared to their white and mixed race counterparts.  The 
ratio of median black to white base pay is 0.72 and, on average, black players lie at about 
the 43
rd
 percentile ranking in the white player‟s pay distribution (excluding the Beckham 
observation).  The corresponding average ranking is 48
th
 for mixed race players and they 
enjoy higher median, though lower average, pay than white players.    
 
Table 2 Here 
 
Table 3 conducts statistical tests for differentials in mean and median pay outcomes 
across the three racial categories.  The parametric F-test suggests no evidence of mean 
pay variation across these groups, a result which is insensitive to the exclusion of the 
Beckham observation.  Given the reliance of the parametric test on the assumption of 
normality and its potential sensitivity to other outliers, the non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis 
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test value is also reported in this table. The test suggests, in contrast to its parametric 
counterpart, some weak statistical evidence of pay variation across the three racial 
groups.  However, using a test suggested by Conover (1999, pp.218-220), there is 
stronger statistical evidence in support of median pay differentials across the racial 
groups.  It should be emphasized that these test results are based on the use of raw 
differences in pay and do not adjust for player performance measures or other 
characteristics.                 
 
Table 3 Here 
 
Attention now turns to table 4, which reports the mean (OLS) regression results for a 
number of different pay specifications.  The first column of table 4 contains estimates for 
a conventional log pay model that includes an array of productivity characteristics, 
selected individual characteristics, team (or club) controls designed to capture attendance 
and other club specific effects like region, and two racial group variables.  The majority 
of estimated effects for the mean regression model reported in this column are plausibly 
signed and well determined with the included regressors explaining about two-thirds of 
total variation in log base pay.  An experience measure captured by the number of 
consecutive MLS seasons a player has accumulated enters in quadratic form and registers 
as a more important determinant of pay than club tenure.  The point estimates suggest 
that base pay is maximized at about 5.7 MLS seasons.  The linear term in age is also 
found to be important and suggests that an infinitesimal change in age raises pay by 
5.9%, on average and ceteris paribus.  A player who has acquired experience in 
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professional European leagues commands a sizeable average mark-up of 70% compared 
to a player without such experience.  The number of MLS games started in the previous 
season yields an average ceteris paribus pay premium of 1.3% per additional game 
played, while „bench-warmers‟ incur an average mark-down in pay of about 3% per 
substitute appearance.  An international player obtains a premium of 67%, and strikers, 
compared to defenders and goalkeepers, enjoy a comparably sized pay premium, on 
average and ceteris paribus.  Players on a club‟s developmental roster predictably earn 
less than others given their apprenticeship status, and there is no statistical evidence from 
this regression model that non-U.S. citizens fare less well in this labor market compared 
to U.S. citizens.                          
 
The point estimates for the two racial dummies are negative, though neither coefficient 
registers a statistically significant effect at a conventional level using two-tailed tests.  
The inclusion of the Beckham observation potentially overstates the magnitude of the 
absolute racial differential given its allocation to the white player reference group.  Thus, 
an „impulse‟ dummy netting out the Beckham observation is included in the mean 
regression model reported in column two of table 4.  The implicit t-ratio corresponding to 
the dummy highlights the magnitude of the outlier effect and suggests that the Beckham 
observation is almost 18 standard errors above the estimated mean regression plane.  
However, the inclusion of the „impulse‟ dummy does not alter the general narrative 
offered above and only marginally attenuates, in absolute terms, the estimated race 
effects.     
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The final column of table 4 reports a specification that includes a small set of race 
interactions which, after some experimentation, were found to be statistically important.
11
  
Both age and the citizenship variables were found to exert differential effects on pay for 
black players, while European experience was found to be important for mixed race 
players.  In regard to black players, there does appear some evidence of unequal pay 
rewards in regard to age where the marginal effect is almost half that of the comparator 
group, which is composed of white and mixed race players.  In addition, black players 
who are not U.S. citizens, comprising about one-half of the sub-sample of black players, 
incur a sizeable pay penalty compared to those black players who possess such 
citizenship.  For instance, the average mark-down in pay for a black non-U.S. citizen of 
sample mean age is computed at –0.479 with a standard error of 0.137 yielding a 
statistically significant effect at a conventional level of significance.
12
  For mixed race 
players the only interactive variable of importance relates to the role of European 
professional soccer league experience.  The group of mixed race players with such 
experience incur a sizeable pay penalty. However, it should be stressed that this sub-
group is supported by a very small cell size and some interpretational caution is thus 
required here.
13
                
 
Using the relevant interactive model estimates in conjunction with the sample average for 
age and the sample proportion for U.S. citizenship (see table 1), the overall estimated 
ceteris paribus black pay effect can be computed.  It is calculated at –0.105 with a 
standard error of 0.08 (prob-value = 0.189), which is close to the figure reported in 
column two of table 4. The corresponding estimate for the mixed race group using the 
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sample proportion for European experience (see table 1) is –0.116 with a standard error 
of 0.092 (prob-value=0.204).  Thus, there is no evidence overall from the mean 
regression analysis of unequal treatment for either black or mixed race players in this 
particular labor market, but this disguises evidence of a potential unequal treatment 
experienced by the sub-set of black non-U.S. citizens.  
 
Table 4 Here 
 
We now briefly interrogate the variation in average base pay across the thirteen teams or 
franchises competing in MLS for the 2007 season.  The estimates are reported in table 5 
and none of the team effects was found to be individually statistically significant in the 
pay equations at an acceptable level nor were they found to be jointly as a set.  Using the 
approach popularised by Krueger and Summers (1988), we report, using the final model‟s 
estimates reported in table 4, inter-team pay deviations relative to the sample weighted 
average.  In line with the above finding, none of the estimates is statistically different 
from the weighted sample average and the overall variability (or dispersion) in pay across 
teams is fairly modest in magnitude.  This clearly reflects the role of the salary cap and 
the nature of the tight collective bargaining arrangements governing contract base pay 
negotiations within this professional league.       
         
Table 5 Here 
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An exclusive focus on the mean regression may provide a portrait of pay determination 
that is potentially sensitive to the role of outliers.  This is likely to be an important issue 
in the current application given the presence within the sample of a small number of 
highly paid players under the PDR arrangement.  The estimation of a quantile regression 
function at the median allows us to determine the robustness of the mean regression 
estimates reported in table 4.  The use of such a model is also motivated by the 
statistically significant finding in regard to the raw median racial pay differentials 
reported in table 3.   
 
In contrast to the OLS approach, the quantile regression procedure is known to be less 
sensitive to outliers and also provides a more robust estimator in the face of departures 
from normality. The former advantage is related to the fact that in the context of the Least 
Absolute Deviations (LAD) procedure, conventionally used in quantile regression 
estimation, it is the sign of the residual and not its size (as with the OLS procedure) that 
is important.   In addition, Deaton (1997, pp.80–85) also notes that quantile regression 
models may possess better properties than OLS in the presence of heteroscedasticity.
14 
 
Using this methodology, the log pay equation can be estimated conditional on a given 
specification for various percentiles of the residuals (e.g., the 50
th
 percentile or median) 
by minimizing the sum of absolute deviations of the residuals from the conditional 
specification.  The precision of the parameter estimates in a quantile regression model is 
dependent on the density of points at each quantile.  Specifically, at those located either 
at the bottom or at the top end of the distribution, where the density of data points is 
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relatively thin, the coefficients are more difficult to compute. Furthermore, the 
corresponding test statistics have less statistical power, and the null hypothesis when 
false may not be rejected as often as it should.
15
 Thus, we focus only on the estimation of 
the quantile regression model at the median where the density of points in the pay 
distribution is reasonably thick.  The sampling variances for the median regression 
estimates are obtained in the current application using the bootstrapping procedure with 
100 replications.
16 
 
Table 6 reports the median regression estimates for log pay specifications both with and 
without the set of racial interactions found to be important in the mean regression model.  
The estimated coefficients now provide the ceteris paribus effect of an explanatory 
variable on log pay, conditional on being at the median of the log pay distribution.  In 
general, there appears little material difference between the mean and median regression 
estimates for the basic log pay specification without race interactions.  However, it is 
noteworthy that, in contrast to the mean regression analysis, the estimated pay premium 
for a striker has fallen by a third perhaps suggesting that the OLS estimate reflected the 
inordinate influence of a small number of very highly paid strikers.  In addition, the 
„bench-warming‟ effect highlighted earlier in the mean regression discussion is now 
poorly determined.  There is no evidence of a citizenship effect in pay and no statistical 
support for a ceteris paribus disparity in pay is uncovered in regard to race.  The 
foregoing findings are altered little with the introduction of the race interaction variables, 
though there is no strong evidence now of unequal treatment with respect to age.   As 
with the mean regression results, the statistical evidence of a pay disadvantage for the 
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sub-sample of black players who are not U.S. citizens remains broadly intact, though the 
estimated effect is now smaller in absolute terms and less well determined.
17
   
 
The quantile regression model estimates containing the interactive variable can be used to 
estimate the overall pay effect for black and mixed race players.  Using unconditional 
mean characteristics in the computation of such effects, however, may provide 
unrepresentative realizations for these characteristics at points other than the conditional 
mean pay to which they relate. Therefore, it is necessary to use realizations of the 
characteristics that more accurately reflect the relevant point on the conditional pay 
distribution, which is the median in this case. In order to address this issue, we use an 
approach originally suggested by Machado and Mata (2005) to derive the realizations for 
the relevant characteristics at the median of the conditional pay distribution.  The 
procedure involves drawing 100 observations at random and with replacement from the 
original sample of 361.  Each observation once ranked comprises a percentile point on 
the log pay distribution. The relevant set of characteristics for the observation at the 
median is then retrieved, which in the current case is comprised of a player‟s age, U.S. 
citizenship and European experience.  This process is then replicated 300 times to obtain 
300 median observations on these three variables.  The mean values of these median 
observations can then be used to construct overall pay effects by race for the median 
regression.
18
  
 
Using these conditional mean values, the overall estimated ceteris paribus black pay 
effect is now computed at –0.045 with a standard error of 0.097 (prob-value = 0.64), and 
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the overall estimate for the mixed race group is 0.017 with a standard error of 0.122 
(prob-value=0.88).  The quantile estimates serve to confirm in regard to race the broad 
tenor of our overall findings from the mean regression analysis.  We can also conclude 
that once productivity and other measures are controlled for, the statistically significant 
median raw pay differences by race, noted in table 3, disappear.  However, the estimated 
interactive effects suggest that there remains some very tentative evidence of a pay 
disadvantage for those black players who are not U.S. citizens (see footnote 17).  
 
Table 6 Here 
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V. CONCLUSIONS 
The availability of salaries for MLS players for the 2007 season has allowed the seminal 
investigation of pay determination for a professional team sport that has been neglected 
by researchers in the U.S. to date.  The lack of an apparent research interest in this sport‟s 
labor market is understandable given its size and market valuation compared to football, 
baseball or basketball.  A casual comparison of median base pay in soccer with the 
remuneration available in the more established professional team sports confirms the 
„Cinderella‟ status of professional soccer within the broader U.S. sports industry.  
Nevertheless, our empirical analysis of the pay determination process revealed that, in 
comport with the analyses of salary within other labor markets for professional team 
sports, a sizeable part of variation in base salary was found to be explained by the 
variation in player characteristics and performance measures.  
 
The paper finds no statistical evidence of variation in pay across the teams that compete 
in the MLS.  This is perhaps to be anticipated given the existence of a salary cap and the 
fact that base pay contracts are negotiated between the league and the players‟ union 
within a collective bargaining framework.  The MLS, in contrast to its progenitor, is 
apparently doing an effective job in ensuring a level playing field in terms of intra-league 
pay differentials.  The greater part of base pay dispersion in the MLS appears to be intra-
team rather than inter-team in nature.     
 
Our key result on race is resonant of the findings for most other professional team sports 
in the U.S. but it is somewhat nuanced.  On balance, we found no persuasive statistical 
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evidence of an unequal treatment by racial group using mean regression analysis 
regardless of whether or not a large and well documented outlier was netted out of the 
analysis.  In addition, the use of median regression analysis confirmed the robustness of 
our key results.  However, there was some evidence that the possession of U.S. 
citizenship appeared a more favorable asset for black players compared to all other 
groups and this manifested itself in the form of an unequal treatment for those black 
players who do not have the benefit of such citizenship.   
 
Future analysis is clearly merited to determine whether these findings are robust to the 
conduct of a richer empirical analysis perhaps incorporating more detailed performance 
indicators than currently available.  In addition, it will also be of some interest to 
ascertain whether our findings on race represent a transient or a more persistent feature of 
the pay structure within a labor market that is an integral part of a professional sport that 
currently operates within an uncertain and transitional environment.   
 
 18 
REFERENCES 
 
Brown, E., Spiro, R., and D.Keenan. “Wage and Non-wage Discrimination in 
Professional Basketball: Do Fans Affect It?” American Journal of Economics and 
Sociology, 50(3), 1991, 333-345. 
 
Brownstone, D. and Valletta, R. “The Bootstrap and Multiple Imputations: Harnessing 
Increased Computing Power for Improved Statistical Tests”, Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, 15(4), Fall 2001, 129-141. 
 
Conover, W.J. Practical Nonparametric Statistics, Third Edition, Wiley Series in 
Probability and Statistics, 1999. 
Cowell, F.A., “Sampling Variance and Decomposable Inequality Measures”, Journal of 
Econometrics, 42, 1989, 27–41.  
Deaton, A. The Analysis of Household Surveys: A Microeconometric Approach to 
Development Policy, Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1997. 
Dey, M. “Racial Differences in National Basketball Association Players‟ Salaries: 
Another Look.” American Economic Review, 41(2), 1997, 84-90.  
 
Frick, B. “The Football Players‟ Labor Market: Empirical Evidence from the Major 
European Leagues.”  Scottish Journal of Political Economy, 54(3), 2007, 422-446.    
 
Hamilton, B.H. “Racial Discrimination and professional Basketball Salaries in the 
1990s.”Applied Economics, 29, 1997, 287-296. 
 
Khan, L.M. “Discrimination in Professional Sports: A Survey of the Literature.” 
Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 44(3), 1991a, 395-418.  
 
Khan, L.M. “The Sports Business as a Labor Market Laboratory.” Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, 14(3), Summer 2000, 75-94.  
 
Khan, L.M. and P.D.Sherer. “Racial Differences in Professional Basketball Players‟ 
Compensation.” Journal of Labor Economics, 6(1), 1988, 40-61.   
 
Koenker, R. Quantile Regression, Econometric Society Monographs, Cambridge 
University Press, 2005. 
 
Koenker, R. and K.F.Hallock “Quantile Regression”, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 
15(4), Fall 2001, 143-156.  
 
Koenker, R. and G. Bassett. “Regression Quantiles”, Econometrica, 46, 1978, 33-50.  
 
Krueger, A. and L. Summers. “Efficiency Wages and the Inter-industry Wage Structure”, 
1988, Econometrica, 56(2), 259-293. 
 19 
 
Lucifora, C. and R.Simmons. “Superstar Effects in Sports: Evidence from Italian 
Soccer.” Journal of Sports Economics, 4, 2003, 35-55. 
 
Machado, J. and Mata, J. “Counterfactual Decomposition of Changes in Wage 
Distributions Using Quantile Regression Models”, Journal of Applied Econometrics, 
20,2005, pp. 445-465. 
 
Medcalfe, S. “English League Transfer Prices: Is There a Racial Dimension? A Re-
examination with New Data.” Applied Economics Letters, forthcoming. 
 
Preston, I and S.Szymanski. “Racial Discrimination in English Football”. Scottish 
Journal of Political Economy, 47(4), 2000, 342-363. 
 
Reilly, B. and R.Witt. “English League Transfer Prices: Is There a Racial Dimension?” 
Applied Economics Letters, 2, 1995, 220-222. 
 
Rosen, S. and A. Sanderson. “Labour Markets in Professional Sports.” The Economic 
Journal, 111, February 2001, F47-F68. 
 
Szymanski, S. “A Market Test for Discrimination in the English Professional Soccer 
Leagues.” Journal of Political Economy, 108(3), 2000, 590-603. 
 
 20 
Footnotes: 
 
1. Kahn and Sherer (1988) and Brown, Spiro and Keenan (1991) provide some 
evidence on this topic for the early period with Hamilton (1997) and Dey (1997) 
reporting evidence for the later era. 
2. Lucifora and Simmons (2003) provide a notable exception in this context with 
their analysis of player earnings in the top two professional tiers of the Italian 
soccer league.    
3. Subsequent research undertaken by Preston and Szymanski (2000) eliminated fan 
(or consumer) motivated behaviour as a potential source for the discrimination 
phenomenon detected.  
4. The players enlisted by the Cosmos included FIFA World Cup winning captains 
Beckenbauer (for West Germany in 1974) and Carlos Alberto (for Brazil in 
1970).  However, the most significant signing, lured out of semi-retirement in 
1975 by a lucrative three-year contract reputed to be close to $7 million (at 1975 
prices), was the Brazilian Pelé, universally acknowledged as the world‟s greatest 
ever soccer player.    
5. The teams are divided into the Western Conference composed of Chivas USA, 
Houston Dynamos, FC Dallas, Colardo Rapids, Los Angeles Galaxy, and Real 
Salt Lake, and the Eastern Conference comprising the seven remaining teams.   
6. Beckham signed a five-year contract with Los Angeles Galaxy.  The annual base 
pay deal guaranteed $5.5 million per year but with endorsements the deal could 
potentially yield close to $200 million over the lifetime of the contract.  This 
would make it the most lucrative contract ever agreed for a professional soccer 
player. 
7. For the overall majority of players, no ambiguous cases were encountered in their 
allocation to racial groups.  In the small number of cases where such ambiguity 
arose, the allocation was informed by the advice of a team of graduate students 
from a variety of different racial backgrounds.  The full allocation of players to 
the three racial groups is available from the corresponding author on request. 
8. This compares favorably to the sample sizes generally available in studies of this 
kind undertaken for other professional team sports (see Khan (1991)). 
9. In order to situate these pay data for professional soccer within a broader context, 
median base annual earnings in the U.S in 2007 was approximately $2.6 million, 
$1 million and $0.6 million for professional players in basketball, baseball and 
football respectively.     
10. The magnitude of pay inequality is not surprising in this labor market given that 
the data comprise players at both extremes of the profession: those securing 
„superstar‟ levels of remuneration and those on the developmental rosters whose 
base pay is close to statutory minimum wage levels.  For instance, some players 
on the developmental rosters earn an annual base pay of $12,900.  
11. A „general-to-specific‟ modelling approach was adopted commencing with a fully 
interactive model comprising a set of black and mixed race interactions for all 
variables other than the club controls. This was sequentially tested down in order 
of statistical insignificance, using a tight criterion for individual statistical 
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significance, to the more parsimonious model reported in the final column of table 
4. 
12. The estimates actually suggest that black U.S. citizens fare better than all other 
groups in the sample.  
13. There are only five mixed race players with European club experience out of the 
sample of 361 data points used in our analysis. 
14. See Koenker (2005) and Koenker and Basset (1978) for a detailed discussion of 
quantile regression models, and Koenker (2001) for an accessible introduction to 
the topic.  
15. Hamilton (1997), with fewer data points on professional basketball salaries than 
available in the current study, elected to estimate quantile regression models at the 
10
th
 and 90
th
 percentiles of the conditional pay distribution.  This is not an 
approach considered prudent to pursue here. 
16. See Brownstone and Valletta (2001) for a simple discussion of bootstrapping 
methods in applied econometrics. 
17. Although neither the „black‟ nor „age‟ estimates are well determined in the 
median regression model, the estimated pay penalty for a black non-U.S. citizen 
with a conditional average age consistent with being at the median of the log pay 
distribution (see footnote 18) is computed at –0.35 with  a standard error of 0.18, 
implying a prob-value of 0.053.  Given that the result‟s statistical significance is 
largely being driven by the sample covariances between the estimates and not 
their sampling variances, this finding should be interpreted tentatively and with 
some degree of caution.  
18. The average and sample proportion values of the three characteristics, conditional 
on being at the median of the conditional log pay distribution, are 23.64, 0.79 and 
0.08 for age, US citizenship and European experience respectively. 
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TABLE 1 
 
Variable Description and Summary Statistics 
Variable Variable Description Mean 
Log(Pay) The natural logarithm of the base annual salary for the 
2007 season (source: MLS Players‟ Union).  
10.813 
(1.022) 
Age Player‟s age measured in years.  25.086 
(4.303) 
Seasons The number of consecutive seasons the player has been 
in the MLS to the start of the 2007 season. 
 2.416 
(2.948) 
Tenure The number of months the player has been at the 
current club to the start of the 2007 season.  
15.316 
(20.765) 
Games Started The number of games started in the MLS in the 
previous (2006) season. 
  9.925 
(11.448) 
Games as  
Substitute 
The number of games played as a substitute in the 
MLS in the previous (2006) season. 
  2.061 
 (3.420) 
International = 1, if the player is an international and = 0, otherwise. 0.319 
Striker = 1, if the player is a forward and = 0, otherwise. 0.227 
Midfield = 1, if the player is a midfielder and = 0, otherwise. 0.380 
Other
§
 = 1, if the player is either a defender or a goalkeeper 
and = 0, otherwise. 
0.393 
Development = 1, if the payer is on the club‟s developmental roster 
and = 0, otherwise. 
0.305 
White
§
 = 1, if the player is white and = 0, otherwise. 0.654 
Black = 1, if the player is black and = 0, otherwise. 0.241 
Mixed = 1, if the player is mixed race and = 0, otherwise. 0.105 
Citizen = 1, if the player is a US citizen and =0, otherwise. 0.698 
European = 1, if the player has had experience of playing in 
European professional leagues and =0, otherwise. 
0.163 
Notes to table 1: 
(a) Summary statistics are computed using 361 observations; 
(b) Standard deviations are reported in parentheses for continuous variables only; 
(c) § denotes omitted category in econometric estimation.  
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TABLE 2 
 
Summary Basic Pay Statistics for MSL 2007 Season 
 All 
Players 
All 
Players 
(excl. 
Beckham) 
White 
Players 
White 
Players 
(excl. 
Beckham) 
Black 
Players 
Mixed 
Race 
Players 
Mean 
 
103,297  88,306 119,409 96,513 66,996 86,342 
Median 
 
  46,331  46,116   50,200 50,000 36,000 60,000 
Standard  
Deviation 
335,815 178,141 409,206 209,565 97,072 82,207 
Gini 
Coefficient 
 0.6284 
(0.0261) 
 0.5689 
(0.0184) 
 0.6574 
(0.0286) 
0.5820 
(0.0227) 
0.5382 
(0.0220) 
 0.4843 
(0.0492) 
90
th
/10
th
  
Percentile 
Ratio 
 14.6  13.8 13.95 13.95 12.09 15.74 
Sample Size 361 360 236 235  87 38 
Notes to table 2: 
(a) Summary statistics for pay measure reported here are based on its non-logged form; 
(b) Values reported for the mean, median and standard deviation are expressed in US dollars; 
(c) Standard errors reported for the Gini coefficient are computed using the INEQ programme (see Cowell (1989)) 
  
 
 
TABLE 3 
 
Statistical Tests for Base Pay Differences by Race 
Test Statistic Pay Differences by Race 
 
F-test (2,358) 
F-test (2,357)  
(excl. Beckham) 
   0.83  
 (0.438) 
   0.87  
 (0.418) 
Kruskal-Wallis Test   4.625*  
 (0.097) 
Median Test   6.869**  
 (0.032) 
Notes to table 3: 
(a) F-tests are based on one-way ANOVA. 
(b) The Kruskall-Wallis test is distributed as a chi-squared with two degrees of freedom. 
(c) Median test is computed using Conover (1999, pp.218-220) and is distributed as a chi-squared with two degrees of 
freedom. 
(d) ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 level respectively.  
(e) Prob-values are reported in parentheses.  
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TABLE 4 
Mean Regression Estimates of Base Pay Determinants for MLS Players 
Variable Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) 
Constant   8.9238*** 
(0.3628) 
  9.0400*** 
(0.3462) 
  9.0010*** 
(0.3974) 
Age   0.0590*** 
(0.0148) 
  0.0531*** 
(0.0139) 
  0.0616*** 
(0.0150) 
Seasons  0.1763*** 
(0.0502) 
 0.1918*** 
(0.0471) 
 0.1899*** 
(0.0447) 
Seasons
2 -0.0155*** 
(0.0043) 
-0.0161*** 
(0.0041) 
-0.0156*** 
(0.0040) 
Tenure -0.0008 
(0.0018) 
-0.0005 
(0.0016) 
 0.0003 
(0.0016) 
Games Started  0.0129*** 
(0.0038) 
 0.0132*** 
(0.0037) 
 0.0114*** 
(0.0036) 
Games as Substitute -0.0283*** 
(0.0103) 
-0.0290*** 
(0.0101) 
-0.0237*** 
(0.0094) 
International  0.5132*** 
(0.0878) 
 0.4806*** 
(0.0826) 
 0.5187*** 
(0.0816) 
Striker  0.4626*** 
(0.0972) 
 0.4662*** 
(0.0975) 
 0.4433*** 
(0.0923) 
Midfield  0.2828*** 
(0.0754) 
 0.2500*** 
(0.0696) 
 0.1929*** 
(0.0678) 
Development -0.4787*** 
(0.0870) 
-0.3725*** 
(0.0836) 
-0.3707*** 
(0.0840) 
Citizen -0.0908 
(0.0851) 
-0.0756 
(0.0841) 
-0.2856*** 
(0.1108) 
European  0.5332*** 
(0.1067) 
 0.5221*** 
(0.1061) 
 0.5162*** 
(0.1095) 
Black -0.1311 
(0.0841) 
-0.1105 
(0.0813) 
 0.5006 
(0.4592) 
Mixed -0.0793 
(0.1024) 
-0.0523 
(0.0991) 
-0.0198 
(0.0980) 
‘Beckham’         †  3.6387*** 
(0.2041) 
  3.4203*** 
 (0.2150) 
BlackAge       †       †  -0.0392** 
 (0.0182)       
BlackCitizen       †       †   0.5420*** 
 (0.1674)        
MixedEuropean       †       †  -0.5935*** 
 (0.2027)       
Team Controls Twelve 
Included 
Twelve 
Included 
Twelve 
Included 
R
2
 0.6773 0.7097 0.7304 
Adjusted-R
2 
0.6522 0.6862 0.7059 
Breusch-Pagan Test for 
Homoscedasticity 
156.3 
(0.000) 
109.2 
(0.000) 
 109.3 
(0.000) 
Sample Size 361 361 361 
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Notes to table 4: 
(a)  The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of a player‟s base salary (see table 1 for definition). 
(b)  Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses based on Huber-White given the presence of heteroscedasticity 
(see Breusch-Pagan test result). 
(c) ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 level respectively using two-tailed tests.  
(d) „Beckham‟ is an impulse dummy taking a value of 1 for the player‟s observation and 0 otherwise.  
(e)  The team controls are Chicago Fire, Chivas USA, Columbus Crew, Colorado Rapids, FC Dallas, DC United, 
Houston Dynamo, Kansas City Wizards, Los Angeles Galaxy, New England Revolution, New York Red Bulls, Real 
Salt Lake, Toronto FC (with Chicago Fire providing the reference group in estimation). 
(f) The prob-value is reported in parentheses for the Breusch-Pagan test. 
(g) † denotes not applicable in estimation.  
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      TABLE 5 
 
Inter-team Base Pay Differentials 
Team Deviation 
from Average  
Chicago Fire  0.1067 
(0.1031) 
Chivas USA -0.0805 
(0.0791) 
Columbus Crew -0.0038 
(0.0872) 
Colorado Rapids -0.0511 
(0.0911) 
FC Dallas  0.1215 
(0.0922) 
DC United -0.0161 
(0.1164) 
Houston Dynamo -0.0853 
(0.1017) 
Kansas City Wizards  0.0471 
(0.0888) 
Los Angeles Galaxy  0.0075 
(0.1152) 
New England Revolution -0.0852 
(0.0851) 
New York Red Bulls -0.0257 
(0.1222) 
Real Salt Lake  0.1150 
(0.1226) 
Toronto FC -0.0552 
(0.1011) 
Overall Variability  0.073 
Wald Test for Overall 
Significance of Team Effects   
  6.720 
(0.876) 
Notes to table 5: 
(a) Deviations from the average are based on Krueger and Summers (1988), as is the overall variability measure 
reported, and includes the Beckham „impulse‟ dummy. 
(b) Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses based on Huber-White.  
(c) ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 level respectively using two-tailed tests.  
(d)  The adjusted deviations are based on regression model estimates reported in column three of table 4 (i.e., Model 
(3)).  
(e)  The Wald test is computed using the heteroscedasticity corrected variance-covariance matrix using the regression 
model reported in column three of table 4.  The test statistic is distributed with 12 degrees of freedom and the prob-
value is reported in parentheses. 
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TABLE 6 
 
Median Regression Estimates of Base Pay Determinants for MLS Players  
Variable Model (1) Model (2) 
Constant   8.9363*** 
 (0.4667) 
  9.2218*** 
(0.4917) 
Age   0.0527*** 
(0.0178) 
  0.0501** 
(0.0171) 
Seasons  0.2195*** 
(0.0621) 
 0.1928*** 
(0.0584) 
Seasons
2 -0.0177*** 
(0.0051) 
-0.0149** 
(0.0061) 
Tenure -0.0015 
(0.0020) 
-0.0013 
(0.0020) 
Games Started  0.0149*** 
(0.0044) 
 0.0147*** 
(0.0050) 
Games as Substitute -0.0121 
(0.0116) 
-0.0168 
(0.0124) 
International  0.4363** 
(0.0130) 
 0.4394*** 
(0.0995) 
Striker  0.2845*** 
(0.0900) 
 0.3047*** 
(0.0948) 
Midfield  0.1378* 
(0.0723) 
 0.1486** 
(0.0721) 
Development -0.5038*** 
(0.1163) 
-0.5656*** 
(0.1193) 
Citizen -0.1217 
(0.1099) 
-0.2806** 
(0.1422) 
European  0.5152*** 
(0.1182) 
 0.4985** 
(0.1320) 
Black -0.0959 
(0.0929) 
 0.6076 
(0.6548) 
Mixed  0.0323 
(0.1223) 
 0.0733 
(0.1266) 
BlackAge       † -0.0405 
(0.0282)  
BlackCitizen       †  0.3856** 
(0.1802)  
MixedEuropean       † -0.7014** 
(0.2999) 
Team Controls Twelve 
Included 
Twelve 
Included 
Pseudo-R
2 0.518 0.534 
Sample Size 361 361 
Notes to table 6: 
(a)  The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of a player‟s base salary (see table 1 for definition). 
(b) Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are based on the bootstrapping method with 100 replications. 
(c) ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 level respectively using two-tailed tests.  
(d)  The team controls used are those listed in table 4. 
  
